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HOW TO AUDIT A KNOWN FRAUD 
by NORMAN C. GROSMAN 
The magnitude of the Equity Funding fraud had not been 
seen in the American economy since the days of McKesson 
and Robbins in the mid-30's. Actually, to begin the 
reorganization of a company with a fraud as pervasive as 
this one is beyond the experience of most professionals in 
today's business world—be they accountants, attorneys, 
trustees, or anyone else. 
The fraud continued for at least nine years. All of the 
mechanisms of regulation and scrutiny, including annual 
audits, did not uncover what was going on. It came to light 
because a disgruntled former employee talked to a 
securities analyst. How much longer the fraud might have 
continued is very problematical. It seemed that it could not 
have lasted very much longer, but I suspect that anyone 
looking at the situation two to three years before would 
have said the same thing. 
The case was originally billed as a sophisticated computer 
and insurance fraud. Really.it was neither of these. It would 
be more accurately characterized as an ordinary securities 
fraud. Ordinary in the sense that the motivation was one of 
inflation of earnings to provide the basis for increased stock 
prices. The purpose of the fraud was to create artificial 
values for the stock. The other aspects of it developed 
during the later years of its existence. 
In talking about Equity Funding as a securities fraud, it is 
necessary to understand that the illegal acts started before 
the company ever went public in 1964. The wrongdoing, as 
best as can be determined, was premeditated. In other 
words, it was planned to inflate earnings, to increase the 
price of the stock. It is unique of course in the length of time 
during which it continued. It is also probably unique in its 
pervasiveness. Most other cases seem to have been limited 
to a few major transactions, usually involving a limited 
number of people. In Equity Funding's case, however, 
there was direct involvement of at least 15 people. And the 
misrepresentation was not limited to a few transactions but 
involved the basic operating accounts of Equity Funding. 
From the initiation of the fraud through at least 1969, the 
procedure was highly simple, took very little time, and 
involved little effort to cover-up. The basic fraud during this 
period was achieved through regular accounting entr ies -
increasing both accounts receivable and commission 
income. It was one accounting entry a month, or one 
accounting entry a quarter. There was no computer 
involvement at all. 
As the fraud developed, it was expanded into the Equity 
Funding's insurance operations, through the creation and 
reinsurance of fictitious insurance policies. Since this 
required significant detailed support, the use of the 
computer became important. 
But the use of the computer in the Equity Funding 
operations was still not extensive compared to its use in 
today's business. While certain fictitious information was 
maintained on the computer, none of it was inputed on a 
regular basis. The information that was added to the 
records was done off-line. It did not involve any special 
technology, or any unusual programming. It did, however, 
require a lower level of controls and less systems 
integration than one would ordinarily expect. 
Part of the nature of the fraud was that it had to increase 
in magnitude in order that the company could show 
increased earnings. Thus, increasing amounts of fictitious 
income had to be created. The company was in an 
extremely tight cash position at the time of the discovery of 
the illegal acts, and it undoubtedly had similar problems in 
the past as well. This required the continual raising of 
additional capital and additional borrowings. How much 
longer all this could have continued is unclear, 
The fraud got its first major publicity at the end of March, 
1973, when an extensive article appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal. A day or two after this disclosure, the Touche Ross 
office in Los Angeles received a phone call from a law firm 
in our city asking us if we would be interested in becoming 
the auditors for Equity Funding. We met with the law firm 
and with the judge and were appointed as auditors on April 
2, The company went into Chapter X reorganization on 
April 5, 1973 and we were reappointed as auditors to the 
company under the Chapter X proceedings. We were 
actually appointed before the trustee. This was an unusual 
situation, but it was necessary because of the extent of the 
fraud, the publicity that was given to it, and the need for 
some work to be done immediately. 
When we started our work, senior audit personnel from 
the California and Illinois insurance departments were 
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already at Equity Funding and had begun their investiga-
tion. The SEC was also present, as well as the FBI and the U.S. 
Post Office. 
The major thrust of the investigation as we joined it was in 
the insurance area. Very little was known about the fraud in 
other parts of the company. Thus, our initial concept was 
much the same as the public concept, namely that it was a 
large sophisticated computer fraud—and an insurance 
fraud. As our work developed it became apparent that not 
only were the illegal acts more pervasive, but that the 
insurance aspects were a later development, not the initial 
thrust. It also became clear that the computer aspects were 
not nearly so important as originally portrayed. 
From the start, we really had two basic objectives in our 
work as auditors. The first was to help establish the current 
financial condition of the company; the second was to assist 
in the fraud investigation. 
To ascertain the financial condition of the company, we 
needed to locate the principal fictitious items and identify 
what adjustments to the accounts were necessary. This 
information did not have to be highly accurate, but it was 
necessary to arrive as quickly as possible at a reasonable 
picture of the company's financial condition. At the same 
time, we started on a more complete determination of the 
financial condition of the company as of the date of the 
filing of the Chapter X proceedings. In other words, we 
commenced an audit of the company's books as of April 
5th, the same day as the reorganization filing, and these two 
phases were done simultaneously. 
The Equity Funding operation covered a wide 
geographical area. The firm was headquartered in Century 
City, Los Angeles, and a part of the insurance operation and 
most of the insurance sales operation were based there. 
There were other freestanding insurance companies in the 
states of New Jersey and Washington. There was a cattle 
operation headquartered in Colorado. There was also a 
savings and loan association in Los Angeles. These free-
standing subsidiaries and a number of others were 
not extensively involved in the fraud, if at all. Of course we 
didn't know this when we started our work, and so we had 
to approach our audits of these companies as though fraud 
might exist. But we adjusted our procedures as it became 
apparent that their records and their balances were reliable. 
Practical Problems of a Fraud Audit 
In performing this work, we started out with probably 10 to 
15 people, and soon had as many as 70 people working on 
the engagement. The work in connection with the fraud 
investigation, the other part of our work, was done over a 
period of two years. The major effort in the investigatory 
area was done after the completion of our audit, since it was 
much more important to determine the current status of 
the company than what went on in the past. 
There are, of course, significant problems in auditing a 
company following an extensive fraud. Most of the senior 
financial and management people were no longer with 
Equity Funding, for example; many of them had been 
involved in the deceit and were immediately dismissed 
upon discovery. But because of the pervasiveness of the 
illegal acts, we were not able to determine immediately 
which of the people who remained were not involved. In 
other words, who could be trusted. 
Obviously, too, the records were in very poor condition. 
Many of them were not complete. We were also not sure if 
any records had been destroyed or altered in the last days in 
an attempt to conceal the fraud—particularly computer 
files. And still other records contained significant errors. 
Because the senior financial and management people 
had been discharged, we had no one to discuss most of the 
transactions with. Normally you have people who can tell 
you the background of a transaction—the nature of it, the 
details. In this case, there was no one to ask. Many unusual 
receivables existed on the books that we could get little 
information on. In other areas of fraud, we were able to 
reconstruct balances, but we had no one to corroborate the 
information that we developed. 
The trustworthiness of those in the computer depart-
ment was one of our critical problems. The regulatory 
people were very much concerned that computer files 
might be destroyed, which is obviously very easy to do. 
Because of this, we had to control from the start all 
computer files that had existed on April 5, the date of the 
Chapter X proceeding. 
Our first step was to duplicate the files as they were 
requested, so that we could maintain control of the 
computer files at all times. While the company's data 
processing people were permitted to continue their 
operation, they had to request files from us whenever they 
were needed for processing. 
However, I think the most significant problem related to 
our uncertainty whether we had complete records. As an 
example, the receivables arising through the insurance 
funding operation had a balance of approximately $108 
million on April 5,1973, whereas the detailed computer file 
totalled only $43 million. We knew there was extensive 
fraud in this area, although we still had no idea of the 
magnitude. That is, we didn't know whether the data 
processing files which totalled $43 million were the 
complete files or not, and it took a significant amount of 
additional work to establish that. We learned eventually 
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that these were the only valid funding receivables of the 
company. There were no others. 
Another major problem was related to a significant 
number of large and unusual receivables. The company 
files and records contained little information on the back-
ground of these receivables—how they arose and, more 
particularly, if they were collectible. As it developed, a 
number of these receivables were fictitious or resulted 
from transactions that did not have economic substance. 
But because we had no one to discuss these receivables 
with, it took a significant effort to determine their nature 
and particularly their recoverability. 
Still another problem was that there were early indica-
tions that certain documents in the company's files—such 
as bank advices, security advices, and bank statements— 
were counterfeit or fraudulent. We had no idea of their 
extent, however, and therefore had to perform extensive 
verification of internal documents with outside sources. 
Finally, because we didn't know the extent of the fictitious 
entries, we had to perform almost 100 per cent verification 
and analysis of the accounts for long periods of time, 
usually for the full year of 1972. 
Another complication, not really a problem, was the 
need to coordinate our work with a large number of inter-
ested parties, including the insurance departments of 
Illinois and California, the SEC, the FBI, the US Post Office, 
and the US Attorney, as well as the trustee and his counsel. 
Certain of the work was divided up, and it was clear that it 
should not be duplicated. As an example, Equity Funding 
showed a receivable from a Liechtenstein company of some 
$9 million. There was no real information about this trans-
action in the company's files. The investigation of the sta-
tus of the company was done by members of the SEC staff. It 
was not necessary for us to redo this work. 
The Question of Testing 
In performing a normal audit, we need to evaluate internal 
control to determine the extent to which we can limit our 
auditing tests. Where there is extensive fraud, it is ob-
viously logical to assume that the internal control is too 
weak to rely on. Otherwise, the fraud could not have taken 
place. Therefore, we have to do 100 per cent verification in 
order to support the proper balances. 
While that is a logical approach, I still do not realty think 
it's the practical or correct approach. First of all, 100 per 
cent verification assumes that all entities and operations of 
the company are involved in the fraud more or less equally. 
At Equity Funding, however, and probably in other situ-
ations, that was not true. There were many subsidiaries that 
were not tainted. Even within operations where the illegal 
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appointment at Century City in Los Angeles 
with Robert Loeffler, trustee of 
Equity funding Corporation of America. 
acts were extensive, not all operations were involved. In 
some segments, records were properly maintained. 
My conclusion, therefore, is that the way to approach an 
audit of this nature is first of all to determine the precise ex-
lent of the fraud. Until then, do not attempt 100 per cent 
verification of the transactions or balances. Second, deter-
mine the true need for accuracy of information. Need it be 
100 per cent accurate for operating purposes? Must it be so 
for reporting purposes, or for the purpose of issuing a 
report? There is really no practical way to issue an unquali-
fied audit report in an extensive fraud situation. Condi -
tions are not clear. For operating purposes, however, it may 
be adequate to have reasonably accurate information. 
In other words, the only way to fully establish a balance 
may be 100 per cent verification. But, reasonable accuracy 
may well be obtained by significantly reduced testing, and 
this would be more than sufficient for the company's con-
tinued operation. The audit uncertainty that would arise 
could appropriately be covered in the auditor's report. 
Therefore, I think the proper approach is to take an ini-
tial sampling of transactions. In other words, start out with 
less than 100 per cent testing in a certain area. But structure 
the testing so that it can be increased in an organized way 
after the initial sample is evaluated. 
It is also extremely important to maintain communica-
tions with all of the investigatory and operating personnel. 
Unfortunately, people tend to be concerned only with 
their own responsibility. They do not communicate auto-
matically to others, even though we all could benefit from 
what is learned by other parties. 
For example, at the insurance subsidiary headquartered 
in Century City, approximately two-thirds of the pur-
ported insurance in-force did not exist. The company had 
created large numbers of fictitious insurance policies, and 
then reinsured them with other insurance companies, in 
this situation, the insurance in-force file contained details 
on the fictitious policies as well as the valid ones. When we 
started our work we knew that a large percentage of the 
policies purportedly in-force were not valid, but we did not 
know which ones they were. 
To identify which of the policies in the files were valid, so 
that regular operations could proceed, the fictitious 
policies were labeled with special department numbers or 
billing codes. The state insurance department personnel 
and company computer people split the in-force file 
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Donald Ingberg, vice president and controller 
of Equity Funding of America, confers with 
Los Angeles audit manager Janice Buswell. 
between valid policies and policies based on information 
provided by former employees who had been involved in 
the fraud. 
The accuracy of the split was not clear, however. The 
credibility of the people providing the information was sus-
pect. The accuracy with which the computer files were 
regularly maintained was not clear. Also, there was some 
indication that in the last days of the fraud, when discovery 
was imminent, the billing codes and department numbers 
might have been changed in an attempt to conceal the full 
extent of the fraud. Because of these reasons, the split 
needed verification. We concluded that the only valid way 
to do this would be a 100 per cent confirmation of the in-
force file. 
This involved extensive computer programming to 
update the files. It took probably a month's planning to 
program the confirmation procedure and to prepare the 
confirmations. The follow-up and other work took two or 
three months. W e used a STRATA developed computer 
program, but even so we used about eight people in this 
confirmation process. 
A 100 per cent verification was necessary because the 
company needed to know which policies to bill premiums 
to, and which policies were valid if a death claim were filed. 
The results of the confirmation indicated that the prelimi-
nary split was substantially accurate. In retrospect, it might 
seem 100 per cent verification was unnecessary, but we 
didn't know when we started just how accurate was that 
preliminary split based upon department numbers and 
billing codes. O u r decision for the 100 per cent verification 
was based as much upon the company's operating need for 
an accurate listing of policies in-force as it was for our audit 
purposes. 
There was another related area in which we did not 
perform 100 per cent verification. The in-force file contains 
information about the policy holder necessary to calculate 
reserves; such as the extent of coverage, the age of the 
insured, sex, any physical impairment which would require 
additional reserves. We felt that this file would not require 
100 per cent confirmation because, while the in-force file 
contained a significant number of fictitious policies, we had 
no indication that other information which would be used 
to calculate the reserve was inaccurate. Of course, if the 
sample tests indicated that the information was inaccurate, 
we could always expand our confirmation. 
In normal audits, we confirm relatively limited numbers 
of balances and transactions. Problems of non-response, 
although significant, don't present important problems. In 
the Equity Funding situation, however, problems arose in 
areas that do not exist in regular audits. For example, in 
regular audits you don't have to obtain information from 
outsiders in order to determine a balance. You go to the 
outsider in order to verify a balance which you presume to 
be correct. In Equity Funding, we had to go to outsiders for 
the basic information needed to reconstruct the balance. 
O n e surprise to me was that we did not get a significantly 
higher level of response than we would have received in a 
normal audit. This became immediately clear in the con-
firmation of the insurance in-force. Despite all the pub-
licity attendant to the Equity Funding fraud, many people 
who held valid policies did not answer our confirmation 
requests. I thought they would be concerned that their 
policy was properly maintained in the company's records, 
but that presumption was not correct. We did get a higher 
level of response than normal, but nowhere near the 100 
per cent level. Many people with valid policies simply did 
not answer our request for confirmation. 
As I previously mentioned, we had to support the 
authenticity of a substantial number of external docu-
ments that were maintained in the company's files— 
because we didn't know whether they were authentic or 
not. The first impulse was to say that no document in the 
company's files could be relied upon. Therefore to the 
extent that the document was an important document, its 
authenticity would have to be verified with third parties. 
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at Equity Funding offices. 
But that, we soon learned, was not practical. Most third 
parties are not willing to cooperate in any extensive 
confirmation process. When this became evident, we care-
fully screened those documents we wanted authenticated. 
Even so, it took a number of months for banks to answer us, 
and other parties were less cooperative. 
Many of the third parties had become adversaries during 
the proceeding. Others were afraid of being sued. And 
some just did not want to be implicated in any way with 
Equity Funding. 
Of course we had no way to force cooperation. W e could 
have gone to one of the regulatory groups and requested 
subpoenas, but that would not have provided the timely 
cooperation we really needed. 
There was also a need to discuss the substance of trans-
actions with third parties. Indeed, the best source of infor-
mation on the nature of a transaction would be the other 
side. But, our ability to obtain meaningful information was 
almost nonexistent. 
In normal audits, we are used to dealing with a final set of 
balances. Uncertainties, if any, are limited and clearly 
defined. In Equity Funding, however, if we chose to wait 
until that point was reached, we still would not have issued 
our report. As a result, we balanced the number of unre-
solved items with the need for getting out a public docu-
ment that had basically accurate information. 
That is why we completed our audit and issued our report 
with a substantial number of uncertainties left unre-
solved—far more than one would clearly expect in normal 
audits. O n e of the principal areas of uncertainty was in 
creditor claims. The attorneys and company personnel had 
started to screen and evaluate such claims only a month or 
so before our report had to be issued. When we issued the 
report, we indicated that the claims had not yet been evalu-
ated, nor had their effect been determined. Our conclu-
sion was that while this was an important area, even if the 
claims had been fully analyzed, there would be no way of 
knowing the ultimate allowance of claims for as long as a 
year and a half. So we completed our work and issued our 
audit in early February, 1974. 
The Fraud Invest igat ion 
Concerning the fraud investigation, there are some ob-
vious points to make. Probably we all realize them. First of 
all, we didn't do this investigation alone. I have already 
referred to the FBI, SEC, the US Attorney, the trustee's 
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attorneys, and the state insurance departments. We were all 
really part of the team and we each had our strengths and 
weaknesses. 
I think it's also obvious that the training and experience 
of a CPA doesn't help him very much when doing work of 
an investigative nature. We have limited experience in 
questioning people and recording the results of that inter-
rogation. Lawyers are trained to do this all the time. 
Much of the fraud investigation goes beyond the mere 
analysis of numbers and records. It involves taking state-
ments—actually testimony—from a large number of 
people who were involved or had dealings with the com-
pany. This really is not our strong point. What we do best is 
to understand the financial import of what we see, relating 
information to the total framework of the company's finan-
cial position. We can evaluate the known areas of the fraud 
and its effects on the company's operation much better 
than can any of the other parlies. We can also provide 
analyses and summaries of transactions in a much better 
way than they can. We are always doing these things. C o n -
centrating our efforts where we have such experience is the 
best way, 1 think, to coordinate our work with that being 
done by the other members of the investigatory team. 
Another important point is that documentation in this 
area is different from what we normally consider adequate 
documentation. Our long experience in documenting 
audit work is not necessarily adequate in a legal or eviden-
tiary sense. So when we start to develop information, it is 
very important that we spend time with the lawyers to make 
sure that we will obtain sufficient detail and sufficient 
support for it to be used as evidence later. 
Roundup and Conclusions 
Touche Ross issued a report on the audit of Equity 
Funding's balance sheet in February, 1974. This ended our 
major man-hour effort. Since then, we have frequently 
assisted in the investigatory aspects. The trustee issued a 
report on the fraud at the end of October, 1974. We parti-
cipated in the preparation of the report and provided much 
of the basic financial information in the report. Since then 
we have assisted the trustee in developing the accounting 
basis for the reorganized entity, and in developing infor-
mation and preparing the documents filed during the re-
organization process. We have also worked with a large 
number of lawyers who are handling criminal and civil 
litigation arising out of the fraud. In fact, the civil litigation 
will continue after the reorganization. Frankly, the work 
done after the issuance of our audit report in February, 
1974, has been far more varied, far more interesting than 
was the basic audit work done during 1973. 
Probably the most difficult part of the audit work in 1973 
was pulling together quickly the number of people neces-
sary to do the work, and then managing a group of that size. 
In retrospect, the auditing and reporting problems seem 
less than the management problems of the audit. 
Recent work has seemed more interesting because the 
people-management problem has disappeared and be-
cause knowledge of the situation and the facts has become 
clearer. The passage of time alone has firmed up many of 
the things that we were uncertain about. Also, the viability 
of the reorganization plan has become clear. And certainly 
satisfaction with the work we are doing is greater when it is 
evident that the company will survive. 
What were the major auditing lessons learned as a result 
of this experience at Equity Funding? Three stand out: One, 
establish the auditor's role and the role of others as early as 
possible, so that each can benefit from the other's infor-
mation and not duplicate each other's work. Two, top pri-
ority must be given to the continued operation of the busi-
ness. Traditional auditing and preparation of reports is not 
nearly so important as is obtaining valid and accurate infor-
mation that will enable the business to operate. If all the 
auditor does is to provide an audit of a financial statement, 
he hasn't best served the reorganization of the company. 
And three, do not be limited by traditional audit ap-
proaches, which depend on an evaluation of the reliability 
of records and controls. In a fraud, such controls and 
validity do not exist in all the company's operations. 
What is the status of Equity Funding today? 
A plan of reorganization has been approved by all major 
stockholder credit groups, by the SEC, and by the court. 
The plan provides for continuing the operations of the 
insurance companies in New Jersey and Washington which 
were not involved in the fraud. The reorganization of 
Equity Funding was completed this spring. The operations 
will be transferred to the new reorganized entity, which will 
have an estimated net worth of $80-$90 million. The 
companies are viable and are presently profitable. £ 
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